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I.  Introduction  
Throughout much of the world, the concept of comity has played a fundamental 
role in shaping modern private international law. Sometimes labelled as a 
“principle”, sometimes as a “doctrine”, it provided the foundation and informed 
the evolution of several rules of conflict. Its importance, however, gradually faded 
as the field of private international law slid into the preserve of the national 
legislator.1 Scholarly attention to the subject followed suit, and private interna-
tional lawyers have, by and large, dismissed it as a historical relic in the name of 
which courts would sometimes fine-tune the reach of their national substantive law 
and jurisdictional rules, refrain from questioning the lawfulness of another 
sovereign state’s acts, and restrict themselves from issuing such judgments and 
orders when to do so would have amounted to an unjustifiable interference.2 
Comity, however, never really vanished: as Lord COLLINS of Mapesbury put it, 
“comity may be a discredited concept in the eyes of the text-writers, but it thrives 
in the judicial decisions” – in particular, in those of American courts.3 This 
conclusion is not entirely surprising: comity has long been acknowledged as a 
foundational principle of American conflict of laws.4 It had a complex and 
haphazard evolution in the continent, which is partly to blame for modern 
assessments of the concept as imprecise and confusing.5 Yet, while the term has 
come to be employed to refer to a variety of practices, these practices share 
“certain methods, values, and justificatory rhetoric”.6 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the elucidation of the notion of 
comity as it is understood in the United States – the jurisdiction where the greatest 
importance is attached to the concept. While other studies have examined this 
topic, they have mostly neglected to consider the phenomenon in a broader 
dimension and thus properly appraise the peculiarity of the American 
understanding of comity.7 It is submitted that this is particularly important insofar 
as the American understanding has affected the development of legal doctrines 
                                                          
1 T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY, Retour sur la comity. Deuxième partie: La comity dans 
l’histoire du droit international privé, Clunet 2012, p. 593. 
2 A. BRIGGS, The Principle of Comity in Private International Law, Recueil des 
Cours 2012, p. 85–86; T. SCHULTZ/ N. RIDI, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals, 
Cornell Journal of International Law 2017, forthcoming. 
3 L. COLLINS, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in J. FAWCETT (ed), 
Reform and Development of Private International Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter 
North, Oxford 2002, p. 95. 
4 J.R. PAUL, Comity in international law, Harvard International Law Journal 1991, 
p. 78; J.R. PAUL, The Transformation of International Comity, Law and Contemporary 
Problems 2008, p. 19. 
5 M.D. RAMSEY, Escaping “International Comity”, Iowa Law Review 1997, p. 893. 
6 J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 21. 
7 J.R. PAUL (note 4); D.E.I. CHILDRESS, Comity as Conflict: Resituating 
International Comity as Conflict of Laws, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2010, p. 11; W.S. DODGE, 
International Comity in American Law, Columbia Law Review 2015, p. 2071. 
Comity – American Development of a Transnational Concept 
 
 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 18 (2016/2017) 
 
213 
elsewhere, and stimulated further reflection on the role of the concept, especially 
when employed by prominent American scholars.8 This has in turn prompted the 





II. The Problem of Comity: Definitions and 
Methodology  
Nearly all common law courts refer to comity, but there is comparatively little 
agreement as to what exactly comity is and how it should operate, leading many 
commentators to be dismissive of the notion.10 Even among those who are not, 
views tend to diverge significantly and definitional attempts seem to be doomed at 
the outset: indeed, one of the most important work on the subject avoids the 
problem by first explaining what comity is not.11 Such definitions are important: 
what use could be made of a notion that “invites intuitive adjudication, and hence 
litigation-inspiring ex ante unpredictability”?12 Such was the wariness towards the 
indeterminacy of the concept that the reporters of the Third Restatement on 
Foreign Relations Law preferred to avoid the word altogether.13  
Most American scholars still anchor the discussion to the definition of 
comity offered in the early landmark case Hilton v Guyot. As Justice GRAY put it, 
comity 
“in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the 
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it 
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of 
its own citizens or of other persons was are under the protection of 
its laws”.14 
                                                          
8 Above all A.-M. SLAUGHTER, A New World Order, Princeton 2004, p. 67. 
9 See for example Y. SHANY, The competing jurisdictions of international courts and 
tribunals, Oxford 2003; E. D’ALTERIO, From judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial 
solution to global disorder?, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2011, p. 394. 
10 J. FAWCETT et al. (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, 
Oxford 2008, p. 5. See also generally L. WEINBERG, Against Comity, Geo. LJ 1991, p. 53; 
M.D. RAMSEY (note 5). 
11 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 87, 180. 
12 M.D. RAMSEY (note 5). 
13 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of The United States § 403;  
A.F. LOWENFELD, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, American Journal of International 
Law 1995, p. 52; J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 29. 
14 Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64.  
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Hilton’s definition remains largely accepted and is quite possibly the most cele-
brated and influential,15 though some have offered slight amendments: KOH, for 
example, accepts the above definition, but clarifies that comity “flows from the 
respect that one sovereign is obliged to give to the sovereign acts of a coequal 
nation-state”, adding that the notion has been increasingly interpreted by American 
courts “as a reason why they should refrain from independent determination of 
cases under the law of nations”.16 This definition has the merit of framing the issue 
in the broader perspective of a discourse on sovereignty and the allocation of regu-
latory authority, which is, after all, the context in which the principle was 
developed.17 
Focusing on what comity does is more helpful than assessing what it is –
and comity, to be sure, appears to have some use. According to BRIGGS, “legal 
thinking in the United States… has found the principle of comity to be of 
assistance in getting the judge to the point where a case is decided”.18 A cursory 
overview on any major database reveals that mentions of the principle are easily in 
the thousands – too many to join with the mourners of the principle’s alleged 
demise. Of course, mentions offer partial answers: sometimes courts refer to 
“other” comity doctrines (beyond the scope of the present article), which are 
wholly domestic in nature and arise from the complex relationship between state 
and federal institutions that inform the law of the United States.19 This study, 
instead, focuses on the uses of comity in cases where “cross-border elements are in 
need of careful treatment”.20 It will thus focus on federal decisions, much more 
likely to regard disputes with cross-border elements, and thus truly international in 
nature. Such inevitable constraints, however, must not be perceived as a limitation 
in a study concerned with the elucidation of a legal concept in a system where 
federal judges have long been identified as the main interpretive community.21 
                                                          
15 N.J. CALAMITA, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of 
International Parallel Proceedings, University of Pennsylvania Journal of international 
Economic Law 2006, p. 626. 
16 H.H. KOH, Transnational litigation in United States courts, New York 2008,  
p. 19. 
17 “Comity arises from the horizontal arrangement of state jurisdictions”:  
J.R. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford 2012, p. 485; 
W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 31. 
18 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 78. 
19 On the topic, see M. WELLS, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 
North Carolina Law Review 1981, p. 59; G. SEINFELD, Reflections on Comity in the Law of 
American Federalism, Notre Dame Law Review 2014, p. 1309. 
20 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 89. We do not mean to play down the importance of comity 
in the relations between the federate states: see J. STORY, Commentaries on the conflict of 
laws, foreign and domestic: in regard to contracts, rights, and remedies, and especially in 
regard to marriages, divorces, wills, successions, and judgments, Boston 1834, § 9. Early 
reflection on the role of comity in this context is considered to properly explain the history 
of the principle.  
21 C.R. SUNSTEIN, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, Harvard Law Review 
1989, p. 413. 
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III. The History of Comity in American Legal 
Thinking  
A.  Comity Enters the United States 
1.  The Sister Notions of Comity and Sovereignty 
Comity is closely related with sovereignty: the history of the concept is thus tightly 
intertwined with the development of the Westphalian system.22 The consecration of 
the principles of territorial sovereignty and freedom from interference made 
personal statuses irrelevant in the face of the territorial law of the state.23 Sovereign 
independence and non-interference served as the building blocks of the new world 
order,24 but proved to be at variance with the transnational relations that formed the 
backbone of seventeenth-century European society and commerce.25 
These transnational relations, commercial and otherwise, were perceived as 
exceptionally important in the newly-independent Netherlands, and it was there 
that the concept of comity was developed to mitigate the effects of strict territo-
riality. Jurists such as the VOETS and Ulrich HUBER developed theories to provide 
an answer to the question of which law should govern a specific private legal 
relationship.26 Their focus, however, was not so narrow: indeed, they did not seek 
to present their work as mere suggestions to Dutch courts, but rather as a new 
model with universal validity.27 
The doctrine was first elaborated in a rather primitive form by Paulus VOET 
in 1661.28 It was conceived as a technique for mitigating the adverse effects of the 
inherent territoriality of statutes: in other words, the doctrine posited that, through 
courtesy, effect and recognition could be given to transactions concluded outside 
the borders of the state concerned. VOET appeared to suggest that the operation of 
the principle was completely discretionary, and mostly restricted to ruling out the 
exclusive territorial application of the forum State’s law.29 Four decades later, 
Johannes VOET emphasized that the extension of statutes beyond the territorial 
                                                          
22 K. LIPSTEIN, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International, The 
Hague 1981, p. 8; T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY, Retour sur la comity. Première partie, Clunet 
2011, p. 863; T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY (note 1), at 571, 574. T. SCHULTZ/ N. RIDI  
(note 2). 
23 H.E. YNTEMA, The Comity Doctrine, Michigan Law Review 1966, p. 10. 
24 H.G. MAIER, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or There and Back Again, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1984, p. 10. 
25 R. DE NOVA, Historical and comparative introduction to conflict of laws, Leiden 
1966, p. 435 et seq.; T. SCHULTZ/ N. RIDI (note 2). 
26 A. NUSSBAUM, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of 
Laws, Columbia Law Review 1942, p. 190. 
27 R. DE NOVA (note 25), at 449. 
28 P. VOET, De statutis eorumque concursu liber singularis, Amsterdam 1661,  
p. 156. 
29 C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford 2008, p. 150. 
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domain of a state was not constrained by any particular rule.30 In his view, comity 
served the purpose of preserving “the primacy of the statute real, subject to such 
concessions as might be made by one nation to another”.31 Its application, in turn, 
remained discretionary.32 
It would be injudicious to read the discretionary element as evidence of a 
rejection of the old, universalist – or “international” – approach to questions of 
conflict of laws.33 Ulrich HUBER’s De conflictu legum, by far the most influential 
work on the topic, provides arguments against any such claim. One of the leading 
jurists of his day, HUBER devoted significant attention to the topic of the applica-
tion of foreign law and formulated an elegant solution using three “axioms”, the 
normativity of which remains a controversial issue. He wrote: 
“(1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that gov-
ernment and bind all subject to it, but not beyond. (2) All person 
within the limits of a government, whether they live there perma-
nently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof. (3) Sover-
eigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within the 
limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they 
do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such governments or 
of its subjects”.34 
The third axiom has long represented a controversial point. It is not clear what kind 
of discretion HUBER envisaged for a sovereign and its courts, or what was the 
nature and cogency of the obligation – if any – to apply foreign law. The contro-
versy, however, has been likely overstated.  
First, HUBER never employed the word comitas, but restricted himself to 
choosing an adverbial – and possibly less charged – form, comiter, also adopted by 
Paulus VOET.35 The Dutch language edition does not even mention any such term, 
but employs the allegorical image of governments extending a hand to each other.36 
As MCLACHLAN observed, comity constituted in this context the cornerstone of the 
building: the idea was not to replace law and rules with a form of courtesy, but to 
use comity as “the basis for the elaboration of a detailed set of positive rules, 
grounded in practical reality”.37 Reading comity as the conceptual basis of a rather 
                                                          
30 J. VOET, Commentarius ad Pandectas, The Hague 1698. 
31 H.E. YNTEMA (note 23), at 24. 
32 T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY (note 1), at 579. 
33 R. DE NOVA (note 25), at 449-450. For an analysis of the issues concerning the 
questions concerning the unity of private and public international law see A. MILLS, The 
confluence of public and private international law: justice, pluralism and subsidiarity in the 
international constitutional ordering of private law, Cambridge 2009. 
34 E.G. LORENZEN, Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred 
Years after, Harvard Law Review 1934, p. 403. 
35 See for example P. VOET (note 28), at 143, 168; While HUBER’s work was 
published before J. VOET’s Commentarius, he was undoubtedly familiar with the work of 
Paulus VOET. See H.E. YNTEMA (note 23), at 29 et seq. 
36 T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY (note 3), at 580. 
37 C. MCLACHLAN, Lis Pendens in International Litigation, Leiden 2009, p. 223. 
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sophisticated set of rules allows to overcome the problem. The modern idea of the 
doctrine as necessitating exercises of discretion by a court do not follow directly 
from the essence of the principle.  
Second, HUBER’s conception of international law was fundamentally a 
GROTIAN one:38 his third axiom spells out an international usage – if not an interna-
tional39 – whereby “the effects of competent foreign laws are everywhere admitted, 
except when prejudicial to the forum State or its citizens, through the reciprocal 
indulgence of the sovereign authorities in each State”.40 Reliance on the jus 
gentium allowed HUBER to universalize his maxims and qualify them as des-
criptive of current practices, with the normative consequences that followed. In 
this regard, DICEY’s discussion of the application of foreign law having little to do 
with courtesy between sovereigns fails to make the grade as a subtle critique of 
HUBER.41  
This was not, however, the way HUBER’s ideas were received in the 
common law world, where his writings eventually made an impact, due to unique 
circumstances, on the minds of students and practitioners of the law.42 The 
scholar’s name became a shorthand to invoke to make a point on the supremacy of 
the forum’s law, in a corruption of the doctrine that was to a great extent a 
corruption of his legacy. 
 
 
2.  Comity in the United States: Livermore, Kent and Story 
An early – and influential – assessment of the doctrine of comity in the United 
States was offered by LIVERMORE, who described it as an expression that was 
“grating to the ear when it proceeds from a court of law”. According to WATSON, 
LIVERMORE, an influential attorney of civil-law Louisiana, was resentful towards 
the Anglo-American reliance on the Dutch jurists.43 LIVERMORE saw the applica-
tion of foreign law as conducive to maintaining friendly intercourse, and “the 
general good”, pursuing in the private sphere the same objective that the law of 
                                                          
38 There is no question that HUBER was familiar with GROTIUS, whom he cites in De 
Conflictu Legum too. See E.G. LORENZEN (note 34). See also T. SCHULTZ/ D. HOLLOWAY 
(note 1), at 578. 
39 Note the GROTIAN expression tacito populorum consensu in § 1 of De Conflictu 
Legum. See the Latin wording in E.G. LORENZEN, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in  
E.G. LORENZEN, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws, New Haven 1947. 
40 H.E. YNTEMA (note 23), at 30. 
41 A.V. DICEY, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of 
Laws, London/ Boston 1896, p. 10. 
42 L. DAVIES, The Influence of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English Private 
International Law, British Yearbook of International Law 1937, p. 49; T. SCHULTZ/  
D. HOLLOWAY (note 22), at 91. 
43 A. WATSON, Joseph Story and the comity of errors: a case study in conflict of 
laws, Athens 1992, p. 28 et seq. See also Saul v His Creditors, 5 Mart. 569 (La. 1827).  
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nations pursued in the public one.44 To his mind, the expression “comity” conveyed 
a sense of excessive discretion.45 
This understanding influenced Joseph STORY, whose work made comity an 
important element of the interface between public international law and American 
conflict of laws. LIVERMORE’s treatise, along with the case that prompted its 
creation, were quoted in the influential work of KENT,46 to whom STORY felt 
intellectually indebted.47 STORY, too, felt that the issue of the application of foreign 
law was one of central importance for the management of frictions resulting from 
radically different state policies.48 The issue of slavery was, of course, a central 
one.49  
STORY insisted that no national law could have, in principle, extraterritorial 
effect, a conclusion that descended from public law principles and found support in 
VATTEL’s writings on the sovereign equality of nations in the field of international 
law.50 Further, the application of foreign law was not mandated: “Every nation”, he 
wrote, “must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the 
duty, but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded”.51 All 
that remained was an “imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity or 
charity”.52 In this regard, STORY’s reliance on HUBER’s theories, which may well 
have supported very different conclusions, has been described as the result of a 
misunderstanding.53 The rationale of comity thus derived “from mutual interest and 
utility, from a sense of the inconveniences” – STORY quotes LIVERMORE – “which 
would result from a contrary doctrine”.54  
                                                          
44 S. LIVERMORE, Dissertations on the questions which arise from the contrariety of 
the positive laws of different states and nations, New Orleans 1928, p. 30; cf. R.C. MINOR, 
Conflict of laws, or, Private international law, Boston 1901, p. 5. 
45 J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 21. The expression in question is “something like an 
obligation upon sovereigns”: S. LIVERMORE (note 44), p. 30. 
46 J. KENT, Commentaries on American Law, New York 1826. In reality, KENT 
attributed the work to LIVERMORE with the title “Dissertations on Personal and Real 
Statutes”, a corruption of the title of an earlier work, by the British scholar HENRY, titled 
“Dissertation on Personal, Real and Mixed Statutes”. STORY, however, cites both authorities 
correctly: J. STORY (note 20). 
47 A. WATSON (note 43), at 27–28. 
48 “To no part of the world is it of more interest and importance than to the United 
States, since the union of a national government with that of twenty-four distinct, and in 
some respects independent states, necessarily creates very complicated relations and rights 
between the citizens of those states, which call for the constant administration of extra-
municipal principles”: J. STORY (note 20), § 9. 
49 See generally P. FINKELMAN, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and 
Comity, Union New Jersey 2013; W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 19. See also STORY’s opinion in 
Prigg v Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  
50 J. STORY (note 20), § 8.  
51 Id. § 33. 
52 Id. § 33. 
53 For an in-depth analysis of the issue, see A. WATSON (note 43).  
54 J. STORY (note 20), § 33; S. LIVERMORE (note 44), at 28. 
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The forum state’s discretion was crucial in STORY’s treatment of the issue. 
His solution was exceptionally elegant, as it managed to universalise conflict and, 
at the same time, reflect his policy concerns by affirming the primacy of the 
forum’s law; what is more, this thesis was in line with the rise of positivism – a 
characteristic that helped it survive and further develop in the American setting.55  
STORY’s engagement with the idea of comity has traditionally represented 
the ideal dénouement of an historical analysis of the concept. Upon publication, his 
Commentaries became the main authority on the topic, and STORY’s legacy was 
very much alive 150 years later.56 But comity – like sovereignty – is inherently 
context-dependent. Its meaning and implications, as we will seek to elucidate in 
the next sections, under the lens provided by almost two centuries of judicial 




IV. The Judicial Evolution of Comity  
The principle of comity was thus developed as a flexible mediating principle 
between a new model of allocation of regulatory authority, based on territoriality, 
and the need to safeguard commercial interests and relations. Flexibility is a key 
characteristic of comity, though the term has been denounced as misleading.57 
Rather, comity, is “flexible” because it takes different shapes depending on the 
goals that need to be accomplished. The following sections seek to elucidate how 
American courts have taken advantage of this quality.  
 
 
A.  “Legislative” or “Prescriptive” Comity: Restraint and Recognition 
1.  Comity and the Recognition to the Law and the Acts of Other States 
While Hilton v Guyot remains the landmark on the issue, statements of the 
Supreme Court invoking comity to allow the application of foreign law and acts 
predate it by almost one full century. As early as 1797 the Supreme Court, in 
Emory v Grenough, had qualified the application of foreign law as due to the 
“concurring consent” of the two governments concerned, so that the “mutual 
convenience of the two nations… which is the foundation of all these rules” could 
be attained without prejudicing their sovereignty.58 A more elaborate discussion 
was presented in the 1839 case Bank of Augusta v Earle, which came even closer 
to STORY’s theories. The decision, which has been called “the original fountain 
                                                          
55 J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 25. 
56 See the citation of the Commentaries in Justice SCALIA’s dissent in Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993). 
57 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 87. 
58 U.S. 369 (Dall.), 374. The case contains an extract of HUBER’s De Conflictu 
Legum by Alexander DALLAS: see W.S. DODGE (note 7). 
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head of the law of foreign corporations in America”,59 and had its drafter privately 
applauded by STORY himself,60 referred to the Commentaries to strengthen the 
proposition that foreign companies could, lacking an express prohibition, make 
business in another state.61 Most importantly, it clarified that comity and sover-
eignty were not mutually incompatible – in fact, because of its voluntary nature, it 
remained inadmissible when prejudicial, but could be welcomed when conducive 
to “justice between individuals and to produce a friendly intercourse between the 
sovereignties”.62 The implications of this case were clear in Canada Southern 
Railway. Co. v Gebhard.63 The case concerned a Canadian railway company that 
was reorganised through a plan agreed upon by the majority creditors and the 
Canadian Parliament, which had then passed a statute to bind the minority 
creditors. Faced with the question of giving effect to it, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “the laws of a country have no extraterritorial force… but things 
done in one country under the authority of law may be of binding effect in another 
country… Every person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects 
himself to such laws of the foreign government”.64 
 
 
2.  Using Comity to Limit the Reach of American Law 
Comity has historically played an important role in limiting the reach of United 
States law. It has done so by acting as an upper limit to the exercise of jurisdiction 
or an interpretive canon capable of making sense of ambiguous statutes and 
treaties,65 counselling restraint or a degree of intrusiveness depending on the 
interests and the context at issue. Of course, the principle has evolved and it has 
been applied to varying measures throughout its history.  
Early cases demonstrate a preoccupation to avoid interference with other 
sovereign nations. For example, in American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co,66 
                                                          
59 G.C. HENDERSON, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Consti-
tutional Law: A Contribution to the History and Theory of Juristic Persons in Anglo-
American Law, Cambridge 1918, p. 42. 
60 C.G HAINES, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and 
Politics 1835-1864, Boston 1973, p. 75. 
61 Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 520 (1839). 
62 Id. at 589 and passim. 
63 109 U.S. 527 (1883). 
64 Id. at 536. Justice HARLAN, however, dissented, arguing that comity was not a 
sufficient reason to enable a foreign corporation to “benefit, in our courts – to the prejudice 
of our own people and in violation of their contract and property rights – of a foreign statute 
which could not be sustained had it been enacted by congress or by any one of the United 
States”, at 539. 
65 An early example is provided by the Wildenhus’s case, 120 U.S. 1, at 12 (1887), 
where the Supreme Court discussed the rationale of this provision by reference to the 
concept of comity and the “inconvenience that might arise from attempts to exercise 
conflicting jurisdictions”. 
66 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
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Justice HOLMES defended the idea that legislation was to be presumed territorial, 
as holding otherwise would result in an interference with the authority of another 
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly 
might resent”.67 On this point, the case had limited legacy: the changed circum-
stances transnational commerce – and, perhaps, the changed attitude towards juris-
diction in international law68 – caused a reconsideration of this approach: in United 
States v Aluminum Corporation of America (“Alcoa”) it was held that “any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct 
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends”.69 No express reference was made to comity – though some echoes 
may be perceived in the discussion of the issue of extraterritoriality.70 It is to this 
case that the “nationalist jurisprudence” that culminated in Hartford Fire, based on 
a growing willingness of American courts to interfere, may be traced back. 
Indeed, the significance of comity grows with the potential for interference 
warranted by grounds of jurisdiction that can be understood as “virtually 
unbounded in scope”.71 Though in certain areas the presumption against 
extraterritorial effect of American law continued to operate in the traditional 
fashion,72 antitrust cases remained fundamentally different. The new approach was 
codified in the Ninth Circuit case Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America,73 
which established an elaborate test to determine “whether American authority 
should be asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity and 
fairness”.74 The Alcoa solution was found wanting in that it failed “to consider the 
interests of other nations in the application or non application of United States 
law”.75 Relying on comity, the Court added interest-balancing to the picture.76 This 
                                                          
67 213 U.S. 347, at 357, citing Phillips v Eyre, L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 239. It must be 
observed that this English case introduced a two-limbed test of “double actionability” (or 
“criminality”), which was applied until a different rule was adopted in Boys v Chaplin, 
[1969] 2 All ER 1085. According to KOH, American Banana is as much a result of 
considerations of comity as it is of the application of rules of conflict, as the acts in question 
were not prohibited in the states where they had been committed and did not therefore 
satisfy the English test: see H.H. KOH (note 16), at 60. 
68 SS “Lotus” (France v Turkey), (1927) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10 253. See also Id. at  
59–60. 
69 Id. at 443. 
70 Id. (“Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as 
those in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the 
exercise of their powers”). The statement was quoted to this effect in Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). See also S.D. PIRAINO, 
Prescription for Excess: Using Prescriptive Comity to Limit the Extraterritorial Reach of the 
Sherman Act, Hofstra Law Review 2011, p. 1105. 
71 J.A. MEYER, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 151. 
72 See for example the maritime cases Lauritzen v Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); 
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v Allied Intern., Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
73 549 F.2d 597. 
74 Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597, at 613. 
75 A. LOWENFELD (note 13), at 44. 
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approach was more consistent with existing approaches at the time and was incor-
porated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations law. Yet, the Restatement 
does not mention the term “comity”, perhaps “because the reporters believed that 
comity carries too much of the idea of discretion or even political judgment, as 
contrasted with the principle of reasonableness, which is conceived of in terms of 
legal obligation”.77 The approach also came under attack in Laker Airways Ltd. v 
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,78 where it was memorably held that “[i]f promo-
tion of international comity is measured by the number of times United States 
jurisdiction has been declined under the «reasonableness» interest balancing 
approach, then it has been a failure”.79 
In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v California80 the Court seized the opportunity to 
discuss the way comity operates in this context. Often hailed as a “death blow” to 
the principle81, the case concerned the conduct taken by American and British 
reinsurance and co-insurance companies, which had conspired to limit their 
offering in the United States, with domestic anticompetitive consequences. The 
reinsurers argued that the Sherman Act did not apply to them, as the activities they 
had carried out were lawful under the comprehensive legislation of the United 
Kingdom, which had “a heavy interest in regulating the activity”.82 The Court, 
however, held that it was not enough for the reinsurers to comply with foreign law 
when compliance with foreign and American law was possible: only a “true 
conflict” would have imported considerations of comity in resolution of the 
dispute. As the situation in the case at issue did not amount to one, comity was no 
ground to decline the court’s jurisdiction. Justice SCALIA criticized the decision, 
correctly observing that it confused two separate issues, 
“the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but 
rather what might be termed «prescriptive comity»: the respect 
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their 
laws… comity in this sense includes the choice-of-law principles 
that, «in the absence of contrary congressional direction», are 
                                                          
76 K.J. FLOREY, State Law, US Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extrater-
ritorial Effect of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v National Australia Bank, Boston 
University Law Review 2012, p. 543. 
77 A. LOWENFELD (note 13), at 52. The author does, however, note that “If agreement 
can be reached or approached on content, it may not be worthwhile continuing to debate the 
terminology”. 
78 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
79 Id. at 950. 
80 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
81 S.W. WALLER, The Twilight of Comity, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1999, p. 563, 564. 
82 Hartford Fire, at 819 (SCALIA J). 
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assumed to be incorporated into our substantive laws having extra-
territorial reach”.83 
SCALIA’s view was destined to be popular: in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v 
Empagran S.A.,84 the Court echoed his words on “principles of prescriptive 
comity” counseling against construing a statute as “an act of legal imperialism”.85 
But Hartford Fire did strike a blow to the principle. In United States v Nippon 
Paper Indus. Co.,86 the First Circuit affirmed that comity was “more an aspiration 
than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of obligation. In all events, 
its growth in the antitrust sphere has been stunted by Hartford Fire”.87 In 
Empagran comity served as grounds for the Court to dismiss the claims relating to 
alleged foreign damages, but not those concerning domestic harmful effects.88 
Though claiming to construe “ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable inter-
ference with other nations’ sovereign authority”, it arguably fell short of the mark 
by allowing for intrusive regulatory interference – rather than helping, as it 
professed, “the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in 
harmony.89 On the whole, the “breathtakingly broad” 90 holding of Hartford Fire 
and its reliance on the concept of “true conflict” are responsible for much 
terminological and conceptual confusion: while later decisions have been more 
critical of this approach, it is sometimes difficult to tell where disagreement ends 
and misunderstanding begins.91 
Outside the antitrust context: comity remained relatively absent from the 
debate on extraterritoriality in cases not concerning antitrust, though similar 
notions were often cited.92 For example, in the 1991 case EEOC v Arabian 
                                                          
83 Id. at 817-8. W.S. DODGE observes – correctly – that this is not what STORY 
meant, because in his time courts did not have the authority to decline jurisdiction. This is 
true, but it might be added that, before International Shoe, courts did not have extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction anyway (except, of course, in admiralty cases): if this detail is taken into 
account, GRAY’s “rhetorical flourish” does not appear to be inconsistent with STORY’s 
thinking. See W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2071. 
84 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
85 Id. at 169. 
86 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
87 Id. at 8.  
88 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). 
89 542 U.S. 156. 
90 509 U.S. 764, at 820 (SCALIA J). 
91 See for example Mujica v AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 599 (9th Cir. 2014), 
affirming that the “true conflicts” approach is restricted to prescriptive comity and says 
nothing about adjudicatory comity (as in the case at issue), only to apply the comity 
considerations contained in § 403 of the Restatement, which deal with prescriptive comity 
too. See also R. ALFORD, The Ninth Circuit’s Muddled Comity Analysis in Mujica, at Opinio 
Juris, available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/21/ninth-circuits-muddled-comity-
analysis-mujica/>; S.C. SYMEONIDES, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: 
Twenty-Eighth Annual Survey, Am. J. Comp. L. 2015, p. 299, 312. 
92 See for example Foley Bros., Inc. v Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
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American Oil Co. (Aramco),93 the principle was only mentioned in the dissenting 
opinion of Justice MARSHALL.94 In deciding whether the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
applied to a Delaware-registered employer operating in Saudi Arabia, the Court 
espoused the presumption against extraterritoriality as a guarantee “against unin-
tended clashes… which could result in international discord”.95 In this regard, 
however, comity operates in the abstract: in Morrison v National Australian Bank 
Ltd,96 a case concerning securities fraud, the Court held that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applied “regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict 
between the American statute and a foreign law. When a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none”.97  
Other cases concerned claims for violation of the “law of nations” under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).98 Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS  
had remained largely forgotten until the early 1980s, when the Second Circuit 
rediscovered it in the landmark case Filártiga v Peña-Irala,99 holding that torture 
amounted to a breach of the law of nations and that the ATS provided federal 
jurisdiction.100 However, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,101 a controversial 
case concerning the alleged complicity of a number of corporations in breaches of 
international law, the Court traced the evolution of the ATS back to its historical 
roots102 and considered the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial ATS 
jurisdiction in terms of interference with both other sovereign states and the 
executive as the sole responsible of the United States foreign policy.103 The Court 
held that the prosecution of extraterritorial conduct such as piracy would not have 
interfered with foreign sovereignty, whereas cases such as the one at issue could 
have prompted resentment.104 These conclusions are consistent with Justice 
BREYER’s findings in his separate opinion in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain:105 as 
                                                          
93 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
94 Id. at 260. 
95 Id. at 248, citing McCulloch v Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 
U. S. 10 (1963). 
96 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
97 Id. at 255. 
98 28 USCA. § 1350. On the increased reliance on custom for suits under the ATS 
see J. CRAWFORD, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, General 
Course on Public International Law, The Hague 2014, p. 164. 
99 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
100 Id. at 878. 
101 133 S.Ct. 1659. On the history of the ATS see A.M. BURLEY, The Alien Tort 
Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 1989; W.S. DODGE, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute:  
A Response to the Originalists, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1995, 
p. 221. 
102 Id. at 1665 et seq. 
103 Id. at 1663. 
104 Id. at 1669. 
105 542 U.S. 692. 
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“universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a significant degree of 
civil tort recovery”, and universal tort jurisdiction threatened “the practical harmo-
ny that comity principles seek to protect” and was to be reserved to a limited 
number of norms.106 This formulation allowed for some headroom: in fact, BREYER 
disagreed with the Kiobel majority over too strict an interpretation of the ATS.107 
 
 
B.  Comity and the Recognition of Foreign Judicial Acts 
The doctrine of comity has also provided the basis for the recognition of foreign 
judgments in the United States.108 In Hilton v Guyot, hailed as “the lodestar for all 
transnational enforcement doctrines in the U.S”, 109 the Court famously held that 
comity was  
“neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of 
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws”.110 
The analysis was partly consistent with the theories of STORY and the Dutch 
writers, and resulted in the rule whereby a judgment was granted recognition 
unless basic conditions were not satisfied or “by the principles of international law, 
and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full credit and 
effect”.111 This principled framework was somewhat marred by the introduction of 
an unclear requirement of reciprocity.112 
Hilton’s significance for the recognition of judgments also faded to some 
degree after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Erie and Klaxon. Indeed, Hilton has 
been considered in contrast to the more efficient rules of state law,113 and the 
                                                          
106 Id. at 762.  
107 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1659, at 1673-4. 
108 A number of authorities have classified the recognition of foreign judgments 
under the heading of adjudicative comity. We prefer to privilege the aspects concerning 
comity as a principle of recognition and treat it separately. For different views see Ungaro-
Benages v Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). See also W.S. DODGE 
(note 7); D.E.I. CHILDRESS (note 7).  
109 H.H. KOH (note 16), at 206. 
110 Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
111 Id. at 205-06. 
112 Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895). 
113 See for example Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 
1004 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Although comity is not a rule of law, it is more than mere courtesy 
and accommodation… Under the Texas Recognition Act the rules relating to the recognition 
of foreign country money-judgments are statutory and therefore more predictable”).  
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reciprocity rule denounced more or less expressly.114 In any event, even before Erie 
many American legal minds were aware of the limitations of Hilton’s reciprocity. 
As early as 1925 Judge LEARNED HAND could affirm on circuit that the Court 
“certainly did not mean to hold that an American court was to recognize no obliga-
tions or duties arising elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign of the locus 
reciprocally recognized similar obligations existing here”.115 Indeed, criticism of 
such a model was quite widespread,116 to the point that Judge Cuthbert POUND 
recognized that the precedent was sometimes departed from quite overtly.117 
Today, comity as a recognition doctrine has largely faded as Uniform Acts 
cover the matter and provide more straightforward solutions. Yet, the doctrine has 
not been sidestepped completely: first of all, comity served as a fallback device as 
the acts had yet to receive a homogeneous adoption by states;118 second, it retains a 
function as a “saving clause” under current legislation, as the Acts allow recogni-
tion “under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country judgment not 
within [its] scope”;119 third, comity informs the statutory construction of the Acts, 
for example, with regards to the concept of “repugnancy”120 or the scope of the 
public policy exception;121 fourth, comity has been invoked in the context of 
injunctions, which the Uniform Acts do not cover;122 finally, it has been argued in 
at least one case that the demands of comity might be met by requiring that non-
enforceable judgments be granted recognition: this might, of course, be a 
meaningful result on its own – one may think of the res judicata effect of such a 
                                                          
114 See for example De la Mata v Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1383  
(D. Del. 1991) (“[T]he court predicts that the Delaware Supreme Court would no longer 
regard reciprocity as a precondition for the recognition of a foreign judgment”). Johnston v 
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387 (1926) (“Comity is not a rule of 
law, but it is a rule of «practice, convenience and expediency… It is something more than 
mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substan-
tial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the 
same question».”). 
115 Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v U.S. Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 747 
(S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
116 Disconto Gesellschaft v Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 580 (1908). 
117 Johnston v Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381. 
118 12 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, at 999 (10th Cir. 2005). 
119 Id. § 11. 
120 See Wolff v Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, at 175 (1979) (“Thus the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act was intended to promote principles of international 
comity by assuring foreign nations that their judgments would, under certain well-defined 
circumstances, be given recognition by courts in states which have adopted the Uniform 
Act”). See also M.P. EPSTEIN, Comity Concerns Are No Joke: Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments Under Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption, Fordham L. Rev. 2013, p. 2317, 
2321. 
121 Naoko Ohno v Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, at 1002 (9th Cir. 2013), citing 
Crockford’s Club Ltd. v Si-Ahmed, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1402, at 1406 (Ct. App. 1988). 
122 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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judgment – and exemplifies a conclusion that could not be reached by the reading 
of the acts alone.123  
In conclusion, Hilton’s legacy remains uncontested authority for the view 
that comity constitutes the basis for recognition doctrines, and comity reasoning 
still fills the gaps left by and fine-tuning the more detailed regulation of the matter 
by state sources. Conversely, reciprocity has failed to become an essential element 
of a comity analysis in this context.124 
 
 
C.  Adjudicatory Comity, or “the Comity of Courts” 
Comity has also been invoked to justify certain approaches towards adjudication 
emanating from foreign countries and, to some extent, international courts and 
tribunals. The notion that the comity may provide the basis for the coordination of 
the exercise of adjudicatory power is usually assumed as a starting point,125 but 
such an assessment belies the complexity of the issue: as MCLACHLAN observes, it 
is unclear that what the early Dutch writers envisaged could so far as to require 
ceding adjudicatory power to a foreign court.126 
Indeed, recognition of acts is one thing, but deference to mere proceedings 
is much closer to judicial abdication. To be sure, this might be truer in some cases 
than in others.127 But in all of them comity plays a role: informing doctrines of 




1.  The Origins of Adjudicatory Comity in Admiralty Courts and the Use of 
Forum non Conveniens 
The origins of adjudicatory comity are to be found in admiralty courts, which were 
originally the only ones not limited to strictly territorial jurisdiction.129 This was 
required by their tasks – relating, for example, to the claims brought by seamen for 
their wages or injuries suffered during employment.130 But taking jurisdiction in 
such cases often meant holding a ship in an American port, which could be 
                                                          
123 Guinness PLC v Ward, 955 F.2d 875, at 889 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e nonetheless 
believe that such goal as well as the principles of comity are still sufficiently served by the 
fact that judgments which are not enforceable might still be entitled, if consistent with the 
Act’s criteria, to recognition.”). 
124 Cunard S.S. Co. v Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 460. 
125 N.J. CALAMITA (note 15), at 614. 
126 C. MCLACHLAN (note 37), at 223. 
127 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 116 et seq. 
128 W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2216. 
129 International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
130 A.M. BICKEL, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal 
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, Cornell L. Q. 1949, p. 12, 19. 
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perceived as an unjustified interference by the flag state.131 In this regard, a choice 
to decline jurisdiction echoed concerns – as one early case put it – “of international 
comity, of delicacy, and of convenience”.132 The common law doctrine of forum 
non conveniens (FNC), the “discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a 
possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more 
appropriately tried elsewhere,133 was a solution.134 
The relationship between FNC and comity is particularly complicated – a 
decision to dismiss local proceedings in favour of a different forum entails an 
evaluation of a foreign court and may amount to “dumping” cases – that is, telling 
another court what to do.135 Indeed, even though American courts swiftly 
understood the significance of the doctrine, the Supreme Court did not link FNC 
and comity for a long time.136 Lower courts, in turn, have sometimes considered the 
two concepts together, but mainly to distinguish them where ambiguity arose or as 
alternative grounds for dismissal of the same suit.137 Indeed, FNC is generally 
regarded as much narrower a ground for dismissal than comity.138 Moreover, FNC 
does not require the same type of sovereign interests analysis: while comity may 
be taken as the basis of “local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home”,139 the two doctrines are best understood as separate.140 
 
 
                                                          
131 Id. at 21. 
132 Davis v Leslie, 7 F. Cas. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1848). 
133 P. BLAIR, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 
Columbia Law Review 1929, p. 1. 
134 Am. Dredging Co. v Miller, 510 U.S. 443, at 464 (1994) (KENNEDY and THOMAS 
Js dissenting) (“From the beginning, American admiralty courts have confronted this 
problem through the forum non conveniens doctrine.”). 
135 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 119. 
136 Am. Dredging Co. v Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 467 (1994) (KENNEDY and THOMAS Js 
dissenting); Sinochem Int’l Co. v Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007); 
Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014) (SOTOMAYOR J concurring). 
137 Republic of Panama v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, at 951 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
138 Norex Petroleum Ltd. v Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, at 159 (2d Cir. 2005). 
139 Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert Storage & Transfer Co., 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). See 
also A.-M. SLAUGHTER, Judicial globalization, Virginia Journal of International Law 1999, 
p. 1113. 
140 But see W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2209–10. “Because the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens allows U.S. courts to restrain their exercise of jurisdiction in deference to 
foreign courts, it is properly considered a doctrine of international comity.” 
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2.  Comity as a Coordination Device for Pending or Potential Parallel 
Proceedings 
While “[c]oncurrent jurisdiction does not necessarily entail conflicting juris-
diction”,141 differences and tensions do arise from parallel adjudication of the same 
or similar disputes in different countries. Comity has served as a powerful tool to 
resolve these problems by providing exceptions to the “virtually unflagging 
obligation” of American courts to exercise their jurisdiction.142 
Traditionally, this has been common in bankruptcy cases, where “American 
courts have consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating or 
winding up the affairs of their own domestic business entities”.143 Granting comity 
to foreign proceedings, however, was soon conditioned to certain requirements of 
procedural fairness.144 Moreover, comity could be afforded “to foreign bankrupt-
cies only if those proceedings do not violate the laws or public policy of the United 
States”.145 
The situation is not largely different outside the bankruptcy context, 
although the approaches are somewhat less principled. In order to defer to foreign 
proceedings, courts have normally required, in addition to the satisfaction of 
demands of fairness and the absence of prejudice to American public policy, an 
assessment of the “relative strengths” of the two countries’ interest to the 
determination of a dispute.146 This is a complex analysis, especially because the 
sovereign parties involved may easily change views,147 but it has been considered 
essential: since “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the 
exception, not the rule”,148 “the mere existence of an adequate parallel action, by 
itself, does not justify the dismissal of a case on grounds of international comity 
abstention”.149 
Of course, whether or not proceedings are already pending in the foreign 
country is an important element to consider. In Ungaro-Benages v Dresdner Bank 
AG150, the Eleventh Circuit drew a line between a “retrospective” and “prospective” 
application of the comity doctrine, concluding that the latter, applying to situations 
where proceedings have not been initiated elsewhere, requires “federal courts [to] 
                                                          
141 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
142 Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
143 Cunard S.S. Co. v Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, at 458 (2d Cir. 1985). 
144 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v Linter Grp. Ltd, 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993). 
145 Finanz AG Zurich v Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999). 
146 Turner Entm’t Co. v Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, at 1521 (11th Cir. 1994). 
147 Jota v Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, at 160 (2d Cir. 1998) (Ecuador first opposed 
and then advocated the jurisdiction of United States courts). 
148 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 
(1976). See W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2112. 
149 Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Canada v Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
150 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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evaluate several factors, including the strength of the United States’ interest in 
using a foreign forum, the strength of the foreign governments’ interests, and the 
adequacy of the alternative forum”.151 The case was atypical, as it concerned a suit 
by a descendant of the heir to a German company against German banks that, the 
plaintiff claimed, had stolen the stock belonging to Jewish heirs in aryanization 
processes. The fact that agreement between the United States and Germany had 
been made to create an exclusive forum for such claims, along with the German 
government’s interests in having that exclusive jurisdiction respected “in its efforts 
to achieve lasting legal peace with the international community” supported 
dismissal.152  
The very act of adjudication of a dispute may sometimes be regarded as an 
unfriendly act, and “extreme cases might be imagined where a foreign sovereign’s 
interests were so legitimately affronted by the conduct of litigation in a United 
States forum that dismissal is warranted without regard to the defendant’s 
amenability to suit in an adequate foreign forum”.153 The other state’s opinion is 
thus of some importance: for example, in Bigio v Coca-Cola Co.,154 the court 
rejected a plea of dismissal on the grounds of comity stating that the only such 
issue was whether the exercise of jurisdiction “would offend «amicable working 
relationships» with the foreign government”. The latter, however, had not raised 
any objections and the Court proceeded with confidence that its judgment would 
not impact international relations.155 More politically charged cases, however, may 
be handled differently: in Khulumani v Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd.,156 a suit brought 
under the Alien Tort Statute by South African plaintiffs claiming that the 
defendants had “actively and willingly collaborated with the government of South 
Africa in maintaining the apartheid regime,157 the governments of both countries 
involved had produced statements of interest.158 The Court, however, eventually 
held that “[i]nternational comity comes into play only when there is a true conflict 
between American law and that of a foreign jurisdiction”, in which case only a 
decision to dismiss could have been warranted, based on interests of the two 
states.159 The question was thus centered on whether one such conflict existed 
                                                          
151 Id. at 1238. 
152 Ungaro-Benages v Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). For 
a case in which the Ungaro-Benages standard was not satisfied, see GDG Acquisitions, LLC 
v Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2014). A similar standard has been 
adopted, though perhaps not fully understood, in the Fifth Circuit decision Perforaciones 
Exploración y Producción v Marítimas Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V., 356 F. App’x 675, 681 (5th 
Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit has remained skeptical of “prospective comity” analyses: see 
Gross v German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 393 (3d Cir. 2006). 
153 Jota v Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, at 160 (2d Cir. 1998). 
154 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006). 
155 Id. 
156 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 259. 
159 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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between litigation in the U.S. courts and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
process in South Africa.160 
This was problematic: it was not quite clear from Hartford Fire that a true 
conflict analysis should guide adjudicatory comity cases, and, if it did, it is not 
clear why it should have focused on sovereign interests.161 This critical point was 
discussed in Mujica v AirScan Inc.,162 an ATS action brought by Colombian 
nationals against an American corporation and its private security firm, for the 
defendants’ alleged complicity in the bombings of their village.163 No other 
proceedings were pending elsewhere and the court dismissed the suit on comity 
grounds: in its analysis, the Court correctly concluded that “Hartford Fire does not 
require proof of a «true conflict» as a prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of 
comity, at least in a case involving adjudicatory comity”.164 It also expanded on the 
test developed in Ungaro-Benages to formulate its own. While the latter test 
focused on “the United States’ interest in using a foreign forum, the strength of the 
foreign governments’ interests, and the adequacy of the alternative forum”165, the 
Court in Mujica attempted to clarify the first element through the lens of the 
prescriptive comity factors which it had previously considered in Timberlane, and 
which made their way into § 403 of the Restatement, holding that they constituted 
“a general list of indicia to which we may look when weighing U.S. and foreign 
interests and the adequacy of the alternative forum”.166 This choice has been 
harshly criticized, and it has been observed that such an analysis seems to be the 
result of a misunderstanding. It appears, however, that the most important 
component of the Court’s comity analysis might have been the deference granted 
to the Executive’s statement of interest, thus seriously downplaying the signi-
ficance of the other elements in picture.167 
 
 
3.  Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Contrary to the English tradition, where “[i]t is easy to take anti-suit injunctions 
for granted”, American courts have on the whole granted the remedy sparingly.168 
                                                          
160 Id. at 285-6. 
161 D.E.I. CHILDRESS (note 7), at 55. 
162 771 F.3d 580. 
163 Id. at 584. 
164 Id. at 600. 
165 Id. at 1238. 
166 Mujica v AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 605. 
167 Id. at 610 (“Accordingly, we «give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view 
of [this] case’s impact on foreign policy», and we conclude that the United States’ interest 
in having the case adjudicated exclusively in Colombia is strong”). The Court cited Sosa v 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 733 (2004); one wonders, however, if Republic of Austria v 
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) would have been a more appropriate precedent. 
168 R. FENTIMAN, Anti-Suit Injunctions – Comity Redux?, The Cambridge Law 
Journal 2012, p. 273. 
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That federal courts have the power to grant them is not at all controversial,169 but 
with the caveat that this power “effectively restricts the jurisdiction of the foreign 
tribunal and should therefore be used sparingly”,170 as being too liberal would raise 
serious comity concerns.171 Indeed, anti-suit injunction have the potential to inter-
fere with the sovereign act of adjudication, albeit to a varying degree, depending 
on whether a foreign court has been already seised.172 
Moreover, “[c]oncurrent jurisdiction does not necessarily entail conflicting 
jurisdiction”.173 Accordingly, concurrent proceedings represent the rule and seldom 
suffice, alone, to warrant the remedy, even when their concurrence might produce 
an “embarrassing race to judgment” or “potentially inconsistent adjudications”.174 
In taking such a “drastic step”,175 comity considerations play a major role, going so 
far as to establish a rebuttable presumption against the issuance of anti-suit 
injunctions.176 
The grant of anti-suit injunctions follows the same logic of comity-driven 
recognition and abstention doctrines.177 Accordingly, they may be issued if 
necessary to prevent “an irreparable miscarriage of justice”, “protect the 
jurisdiction of the enjoining court”, or to “prevent the litigant’s evasion of the 
important public policies of the forum”.178 A more principled approach has been 
developed by the Ninth Circuit. Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc.179 clarified that an 
injunction would likely be consistent with comity where the enforcement of a 
choice of forum agreement is sought, less so in politically sensitive situations in 
which foreign relations implications are expected.180 In midstream cases, the 
                                                          
169 See for example Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v Nat’l Hockey League, 652 
F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A federal district court with jurisdiction over the parties has 
the power to enjoin them from proceeding with an action in the courts of a foreign 
country”).  
170 United States v Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985). Of historical interest, 
see Peck v Jenness, 48 U.S. 612 (1849). 
171 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987). 
172 A. BRIGGS (note 2), at 125–6. 
173 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
174 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
175 Gau Shan Co. v Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992). 
176 Quaak v Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st 
Cir. 2004). 
177 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
178 Id. at 927.  
179 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). See also E. & J. Gallo Winery v Andina Licores 
S.A., 446 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006) 
180 Id. at 887. 
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comity analysis should consider elements such as whether the foreign suit has been 
initiated at a later moment for seemingly abusive purposes.181 
Here, too, public policy exceptions play a role, though the standard is 
stricter in recognition of greater potential for interference. An evasion of public 
policy warranting the remedy cannot thus be found in “the availability of slight 
advantages in the substantive or procedural law”,182 such as, for example, the 
unavailability of a treble damages remedy.183 Interestingly, anti-suit injunctions 
have instead been granted because they frustrated a United States policy favoring 
forum selection clauses184 and “the liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses”.185 
 
 
D.  “Executive” or “Sovereign-Party” Comity 
Some uses of comity have been assigned the confusing label of “executive”.186 The 
adjective professedly conveys the idea of deference to “the executive acts of 
foreign countries”187, and provides the basis for the Act of State doctrine, foreign 
sovereign immunity and the privilege of foreign governments to bring suit in 
United States courts. This terminology adds to the confusion stemming from the 
likely involvement of the Executive branch in the cross-border affairs that 
normally justify such doctrines, and some alternative formulations, such as 
“sovereign party comity” have been proposed, though they are not without 
drawbacks.188 For reasons of intelligibility, we adopt here the traditional approach. 
 
 
1.  Comity and the Act of State Doctrine 
The Act of State doctrine prevents American courts from questioning the validity 
of an act concluded by a foreign government in its territory. The classical 
statement of the doctrine is provided in Underhill v Hernandez, where the Supreme 
Court affirmed that  
                                                          
181 Id. 
182 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 932 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
183 Gau Shan Co. v Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1358 (6th Cir. 1992). 
184 E. & J. Gallo Winery v Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“We hold that Andina’s pursuit of litigation in Ecuador, in violation of the forum selection 
clause, frustrates a policy of the United States courts”). 
185 Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda v GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 
369 F.3d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 2004). The opinion cites Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985). 
186 See for example D.E.I. CHILDRESS (note 7), at 47; M.W. LIEN, The Cooperative 
and Integrative Models of International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using 
Transnational Discovery and Breard Scenarios, Catholic University Law Review 2000,  
p. 595.  
187 M.D. RAMSEY (note 5). 
188 W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2079. 
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“Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its 
own territory”.189 
The doctrine is understood to stem from considerations of international comity, as 
“[t]o permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and 
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly imperil the ami-
cable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations”.190 But what, 
precisely, does comity require in this context? 
It has been suggested that the interests protected by the doctrine have 
changed, moving from mutual convenience, to respect for sovereignty, and, finally, 
consideration for the foreign relations interests of the United States and preroga-
tives of the political branches.191 These foreign policy concerns are exemplified by 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, concerning an expropriation to the 
detriment of an American company by the Cuban government, which also brought 
the suit.192 This latter circumstance, along with the alleged illegality of the 
expropriation under international law, had prompted the defendant to argue that the 
act of state doctrine could not apply.193 The Court, however, held otherwise, stating 
that 
“[t]he doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong 
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of 
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than 
further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the 
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere”.194 
Comity thus provides a basis of the rule.195 It must be noted, however, that the 
deference to foreign sovereignty is also a result of precise policy determinations. 
Accordingly, deference must also be paid to the branch of government best suited 
to pursue them: the Executive.196 The Supreme Court has clarified that that the act 
                                                          
189 168 U.S. 250, at 252 (1897). 
190 Oetjen v Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) at 304. 
191 W.S. DODGE (note 7); J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 31. 
192 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
193 Indeed, this hypothesis is now covered by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 
(amended 2000) (28 U.S. Code § 1605), which exclude the application of the act of state 
doctrine for declining jurisdiction over confiscations of property violating international law 
after 1 January 1959. 
194 376 U.S. 398, at 423. 
195 Though the contention has been made that the Act of State doctrine can be 
explained without references to comity: M.D. RAMSEY (note 5). 
196 “The act of state doctrine does, however, have «constitutional» underpinnings. It 
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of 
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and 
implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations.” Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, at 423. According to PAUL, the Court’s desire to give the government the 
widest possible discretion in dealing with communist states prompted the ironic and 
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of state doctrine, much like sovereign immunity,197 was “judicially created to effec-
tuate general notions of comity among nations and among the respective branches 
of the Federal Government”.198 Such doctrines need to be malleable enough to suit 
the needs of the Executive: and in Sabbatino, the Executive had “expressly stated 
that an inflexible application of the act of state doctrine by this Court would not 
serve the interests of American foreign policy”.199 
According to KOH, “by explicitly linking the doctrine to separation of 
powers, Sabbatino implied that determinations regarding the legality of foreign 
state acts are quasi-political questions, whose decision is appropriately confided in 
the Executive”.200 Almost twenty years later, the Court partially endorsed this 
reconstruction in Kirkpatrick,201 arguing that the judiciary’s “engagement in the 
task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder the conduct of 
foreign affairs”.202 Yet, the judgment restricted its operation to situations concer-
ning a specific act having bearing on the outcome of a dispute.203 In other words, 
the “embarrassment” of any government does not, in and by itself, constitute a 
sufficient reason for dismissal.204  
Kirkpatrick may thus be said to have mitigated the significance of comity 
for the use of the doctrine – and indeed, as far as its application is concerned, Joel 
PAUL is absolutely correct in observing that “[t]he risk of embarrassing the 
executive is a curious rationale for a conflicts principle”.205 The point is that, if 
“embarrassment” belongs within the semantic spectrum of comity, the contrary is 
not necessarily true. In fact, the comity that explains the origin of the doctrine – it 
was through comity that American courts created it in their quest to “accommodate 
respect for foreign sovereignty with growing American intercourse with other 
                                                          
contradictory result of replacing deference to party autonomy with deference to the Execu-
tive: J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 32. 
197 However, “[u]nlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which merely raises a 
jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign states with a substantive 
defense on the merits. Under that doctrine, the courts of one state will not question the 
validity of public acts (acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns within their own 
borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of the 
litigants has standing to challenge those acts”: Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 
700 (2004). See also Samantar v Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, at 322 (2010). Most importantly, as 
Justice MARSHALL pointed out in a dissent, the two “differ fundamentally in their focus and 
in their operation. Sovereign immunity accords a defendant exemption from suit by virtue of 
its status. By contrast, the act of state doctrine exempts no one from the process of the court. 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725-26 (1976). 
198 First Nat’l City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, at 762 (1972). 
199 Id. at 767. 
200 H.H. KOH, Transnational public law litigation, Yale Law Journal 1991, p. 2362. 
201 Kirkpatrick & Co. v Evtl. Tectonics, 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 
202 Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, at 404. 
203 Id. at 406. 
204 Id. at 410. 
205 J.R. PAUL (note 4), at 32. 
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nations”206 – is very much the same comity that remains relevant for the modern-
day life of the institution. In other words, comity, intended as a tool to promote 
successful political and commercial relations, supports the idea of deference to the 
Executive, assumed as the branch capable of best pursuing these objectives. 
 
 
2.  Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines of sovereign immunity have long been recognised to be based on com-
ity. A reference to the principle is absent in the early landmark case The Schooner 
Exchange v McFaddon.207 Delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice 
MARSHALL carefully balanced his language, referring obliquely to the language of 
the law of nations and succeeding in illustrating exceptions to national jurisdiction 
while reaffirming the absolute nature of sovereignty.208 Yet, MARSHALL referred to 
“distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose 
mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other”.209 Other authorities, 
too, support a comity-driven reading of the decision.210 
In the Twentieth Century, this relationship was investigated further. In 
Guaranty Trust Co. v United States comity was understood to require that “foreign 
sovereigns and their public property [be] held not to be amenable to suit in our 
courts without their consent”,211 while in City Bank of New York v Republic of 
China, Justice REED found the word appropriate to describe a relaxation of 
jurisdictional rules – in light of the fact that any such consent could be easily 
revoked by the sovereign.212 Finally, in Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria,213 
the Court interpreted The Exchange as qualifying sovereign immunity as “a matter 
of grace and comity… and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution”.214 For the 
                                                          
206 H.H. KOH (note 200), at 2257. 
207 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
208 P.C. JESSUP, Transnational Law, New Haven 1956. 
209 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. 116, at 137. 
210 The Parlement Belge, (1880) 5 P.D. 197. See also Compania Naviera Vascon-
gado v Steamship “Cristina”, [1938] A.C. 485. The case is remembered as most divisive: 
see M.N. SHAW, International Law, Cambridge 2008, p. 705, (Lord MAUGHAM J “the word 
«comity», whatever may be its defects in regard to other rules of private international law, 
has a very powerful significance”. 
211 304 U.S. 126 (1938), at 134-5. 
212 Cf. La Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, at 352-3 (1822). “But as such consent 
and license is implied only from the general usage of nations, it may be withdrawn upon 
notice at any time, without just offence, and if afterwards such public ships come into our 
ports, they are amenable to our laws in the same manner as other vessels”: 20 U.S. 283, at 
352-3 (1822). 
213 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
214 Id. at 486. See also, seemingly suggesting that The Exchange had generally been 
interpreted too broadly, Samantar v Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). See also Republic of 
Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2255 (U.S., 2014): (“Foreign sovereign 
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Court, this justified deference to the determinations of the executive when deciding 
whether to exercise jurisdiction against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentali-
ties.215 Comity thus continues to shape the doctrine of immunity. Not only is it 
often referenced and discussed at length as the basis of immunity; it is also used to 
explain what precisely immunity, pursuing the interests of comity, requires.216 
 
3.  The Privilege of Suit 
Finally, comity has traditionally served as the traditional justification for the privi-
lege granted to foreign governments to bring suit in United States courts. The 
Supreme Court recognized this function as early as 1870, stating that “[a] foreign 
sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature 
against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts. To deny him this privilege 
would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling”.217 One consequence of this 
approach to granting of the privilege was the ability to preserve “the discretion of 
the United States to deny it, at least to foreign states that are at war with the United 
States or not recognized by it”.218 Later decisions have confirmed this approach,219 
but have also highlighted that the treatment of the issue differs significantly from 
that of immunity: as the Court put it in a later case, “[b]y voluntarily appearing in 
the role of suitor it abandons its immunity from suit and subjects itself to the 
procedure and rules of decision governing the forum which it has sought”.220 
Again, the concept of comity has continued to be relevant: for example, it 
has been relied on for purposes of statutory interpretation in Pzifer, where the 
Court relied on it to affirm that a sovereign state damaged by anticompetitive 
conduct could sue for treble damages in United States district courts and could 
thus, under the Clayton Act,221 qualify as “persons”.222  
It has been argued that comity, the roots of the privilege notwithstanding, 
has now a much smaller role to play, and that questions concerning suits brought 
                                                          
immunity is, and always has been, “a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United 
States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”). 
215 Verlinden B.V, 461 U.S. 480, at 486 (1983). See also Dole Food Co. v 
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) and First National City Bank v Banco Para el Comercio 
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (relying on Hilton). 
216 553 U.S. 851, at 851 (2008) (“Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes 
the comity interests that have contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine”). 
217 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, at 167-8 (1870). 
218 W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2091 citing the authority of Pfizer, Inc. v Gov’t of India, 
434 U.S. 308. 
219 “Although comity is often associated with the existence of friendly relations 
between states… prior to some recent lower court cases which have questioned the right of 
instrumentalities of the Cuban Government to sue in our courts, the privilege of suit has 
been denied only to governments at war with the United States”: Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
at 409. 
220 Guaranty Trust Co. v United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), at 134-5. 
221 15 U.S. Code § 12. 
222 434 U.S. 308, at 311-312. 
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by foreign governments can be resolved by clear-cut – if judge-made – rules (as 
opposed to standards).223 But as a less dated Second Circuit decision puts it, reli-
ance on comity highlights “that foreign nations are external to the constitutional 
compact, and it preserves the flexibility and discretion of the political branches in 




V. United States Experience and the Global 
Dimension of Comity  
In the foregoing sections we have examined the approach American courts and 
scholars have adopted when dealing with the concept of comity. It is now time to 




A.  Comity Doctrines and Comity Reasoning 
An analysis of the notion of comity in American law highlights the variety of 
meanings that are commonly associated with the expression, but also reveals the 
number of doctrines and rules that in comity find their rationale. The notion thus 
informs a variety of areas and it is difficult to drive out the impression that, today 
as in HUBER’s time, comity has been to judges “a springboard from which they 
proceeded to develop a highly organized and sophisticated set of choice of law 
rules”.225 While American courts have largely lost touch with the conflict of laws 
roots (and rationale) of the comity doctrine, which would provide “a more 
principled basis for applying the doctrine in transnational cases by bringing 
sovereign interests to light” and allowing for a more reasoned mediation between 
them,226 comity continues to play a role. 
The metaphor of “comity as a springboard” does not fully describe its role 
in American law anymore, and we need not enter discussions on whether its 
demands are met by the application of rules or standards.227 The point is that 
comity often enters the picture in a more oblique manner than it is generally 
suggested, and that what we may label “comity reasoning” is as important as the 
reliance on the “principle” or the “doctrine” of comity.  
One illustration is offered by the numerous references to comity in the 
context of decisions involving international law. To many commentators, 
American courts have consistently struggled to distinguish one from the other. Yet, 
                                                          
223 W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2126. 
224 Price v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
225 C. MCLACHLAN (note 37), at 222. 
226 D.E.I. CHILDRESS (note 7), at 63. 
227 W.S. DODGE (note 7), at 2124. 
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in many cases, it appears that courts have simply used the concept of comity as 
lens through which they were required to ascertain what exactly international law 
permitted or required. Indeed, the idea that the interpretation of norms of interna-
tional law may draw inspiration from comity is not theoretically illogical, espe-
cially if comity’s theoretical vicinity with the principle of good faith is taken into 
account.228 When these aspects are considered, the cogency of comity appears in 
another light: statements to the effect that “the king is wise and good” clearly work 
much better in the context of domestic statutory interpretation than they do with 
regards to international sources.229 In other words there might be method in the 
American judiciary’s apparent confusion of comity and public international law, in 
that the former allows to give proper effect to the latter. 
 
 
B.  The Problem of Deference to the Executive 
The debate on comity in the United States has often turned into a discussion on 
separation of powers. Comity, it may be recalled, is largely agent-agnostic in terms 
of which among the powers exercises it – HUBER’s own statement of the doctrine 
supports as much.230 It also accords with the rationale of many canons of statutory 
interpretation, first and foremost the presumption against extraterritoriality, which 
assumes comity to have been exercised by the legislative branch, the role of the 
judiciary being limited to an ex post recognition of such exercise. Yet, by looking 
at the instances in which comity has been invoked and the issue of deference to the 
Executive raised, one would not conclude that the problem of separation of powers 
fits so neatly in the life of the doctrine. In practice, the most troubling links 
between comity and deference to the executive stem from sensitive matters arising 
from cross-border or international disputes. 
Comparable occurrences before courts of other nations have not prompted 
courts to grant the political branches such a substantial degree of deference.231 
More precisely, a more limited number of hypotheses call for this type of 
deference, which is, conversely, deeply rooted in American legal thinking 
continues to encourage one of the most unbending “myths” of international 
comity.232 This difficulty has less to do with questions relating to the United States 
form of government than with certain attitudes of the American judiciary, 
divided – when dealing with issues of foreign affairs – between the opposed 
                                                          
228 J. KÄMMERER, Comity, in R. WOLFRUM (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. 
229 E.S. MORGAN, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England 
and America, New York 1989, p. 29. 
230 E.G. LORENZEN (note 39), at 227. See also Hartford Fire, at 813 (SCALIA J). 
231 For example, in the United Kingdom the question of deference to executive 
power normally arises in the context of political questions and issues of justiciability. For an 
example concerning the grant of diplomatic protection and the position of the British Court 
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approaches of a “customary” practise of judicial abdication233 and their constitu-
tional “province and duty… to say what the law is”.234 Further, contrary to obse-
quiousness to the will of Congress, deference to the executive could also be seen as 
undermining the principle of democratic accountability, and the advocacy of 
Executive power in this area has been linked to the growing fear of the “Soviet 
threat”.235 As Curtis BRADLEY has persuasively observed, the main problem with 
the hoary problem of deference is that it has been traditionally perceived as a 
unitary phenomenon, when in fact it cannot be labelled as such.236  
While there is no reason why a court cannot be invested of an issue having 
cross-border significance and conduct its comity analysis, where needed, alone, 
common sense and institutional courtesy limit this kind of behavior. But if 
deference must be granted to the executive, is it possible to conceptualise a 
framework for doing so?  
It has been suggested that borrowing the doctrine of Chevron237 deference 
from administrative law could be particularly fruitful.238 Broadly speaking, the 
Chevron doctrine requires courts to engage in a two-step analysis in the 
interpretation of statutes, first determining whether Congress has spoken clearly on 
the question at issue, and then giving deference to the reading put forward by the 
governmental agency tasked with the administration of the statute itself, insofar as 
it is permissible.239 The rationale for this deference is that “[j]udges are not experts 
in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government”, while 
agencies are both better placed and more politically accountable – if only through 
the Chief Executive.240  
However, the appropriateness of the Chevron model is highly context-
dependent: to defer to the Executive’s interpretation of a treaty is not the same 
thing as relying on its determination as to whether the Act of State doctrine should 
not be applied,241 or a foreign head of state granted immunity from jurisdiction.242 
The concept of deference is clearly not unitary.243 Even worse would be to argue 
that deference to the executive should inform “the core responsibility of the courts 
to manage their dockets and decide cases”.244  
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Beyond this aspect, the involvement of the Executive need not, in and by 
itself, be considered incompatible with the doctrine of comity. We may consider 
the role of deference within the broader framework of “foreign relations law” – a 
legal category that is well-established in the United States, if less so elsewhere.245 
MCLACHLAN, who has devoted considerable attention to the field, describes 
foreign relations law as performing an “allocative function”.246 As the author 
contends, this function is an aggregate of two different ones, in that it controls the 
jurisdiction and applicable law “in the external exercise and control of the public 
power of states” and contributes to the ordering of “the allocation of foreign affairs 
competence within the municipal constitution”.247 This function obeys to a conflict 
of laws logic: however, while conflict involves determinations that follow a “two-
dimensional” approach considering two systems of municipal law, foreign 
relations law implicates a “three-dimensional” judgment on the allocation of 
institutional competence.248 In the United States, foreign relations law is a 
fundamentally internal matter and reflects the American Constitution’s structural 
aspects. It follows that constitutional prerogatives of the Executives make it so that 
deference is, if not always necessary, justifiable. To this extent, this is compatible 
with the Courts’ “judicial duty to know and to declare” the “comity of our own 
country” is probably a question.249 
On the one hand, the Executive may appeal because of its expertise and 
accountability;250 on the other hand, there may be questions of legitimacy and fear 
of being led onto a short-term focused agenda with potentially harmful long-term 
consequences.251 But above all, BRADLEY is right in observing that “[e]ach 
opportunity for deference invites pressure from foreign governments and creates 
the possibility of diplomatic backlash if the Executive decides not to support their 
positions”.252 In this regard, the pattern established in limiting the reliance on 
executive determinations in both the areas of foreign sovereign immunity support 
the proposition that the “government need not, and should not, speak in every 
case”: as then legal adviser to the Department of State Harold KOH’ put it, “[i]n 
domestic litigation, [the Department’s] ultimate goal is, in fact, not more verbiage, 
but more silence”. 
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C.  Beyond the Domestic: the “Comity of Courts” as a Global Ordering 
Principle 
In 1998, in the wake of Breard v Greene253 and the provisional measures issued by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case concerning the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations254, Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER penned a seminal essay on 
the American Journal of International Law in which she discussed the implications 
of the Supreme Court’s decision not to accord a stay of execution in compliance 
with the World Court’s order.255 SLAUGHTER observed that, irrespective of whether 
the measures issued by the ICJ were binding,256 the Supreme Court should have 
nonetheless honored the request “as a matter of judicial comity”.257 SLAUGHTER 
further observed that the United States judiciary was re-discovering the concept of 
“judicial comity”, building the case on the basis of SCALIA’s dissent in Hartford 
Fire. The “comity of courts” terminology left much to be desired, but provided an 
opportunity to describe comity as “the lubricant of transjudicial relations”.258 
SLAUGHTER’s understanding of “judicial comity” later evolved as one of the build-
ing blocks of the theoretical model she developed in later writings for the 
construction of a global legal system through the concerted work of domestic 
courts. In A New World Order she described it as providing 
“… the framework and the ground rules for a global dialogue among 
judges in the context of specific cases. It has four distinct strands. 
First is a respect for foreign courts qua courts, rather than simply as 
the face of a foreign government… Second is the related recognition 
that courts in different nations are entitled to their fair share of 
disputes – both as co-equals in the global task of judging and as the 
instruments of a strong «local interest in having localized 
controversies decided at home». Third is a distinctive emphasis on 
individual rights and the judicial role in protecting them. Fourth […] 
is a greater willingness to clash with other courts when necessary, as 
an inherent part of engaging as equals in a common enterprise”.259 
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To be sure, SLAUGHTER’s claims have sometimes been portrayed as vaguely 
starry-eyed: most notably, while acknowledging that conflict between courts is 
inevitable, she argues that it is conducive to greater dialogue, and thus comity.260 
As MILLS and STEPHENS have observed, such a claim relies on the questionable 
notion that “the «special» character of courts” and “a capacity of a free market of 
legal ideas to avoid distortions caused by inequalities of power” will allow 
substantive conflict avoidance through agreed procedure.261 Yet, SLAUGHTER’s 
theory has proved fascinating to many, especially with scholars of public 
international law. In the context of its “fragmentation” and the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals, it has been argued that comity might have the 
potential of mitigating the resulting problems.262 The practice of international 
adjudication and arbitration too seems to provide a number of indications that 
international adjudicators are conscious of the value of comity, and respect each 
other’s competence and decision-making capacity, displaying an awareness of 
their status as “co-equals in the global task of judging” and recognising different 
specializations.263 This attitude seems to transcend simple institutional dialogue,264 
rather amounting to “an emerging general principle of international procedural 
law”.265 Indeed, there are indications that comity has served as a valuable tool even 
when dealing with competing proceedings before courts of different orders.266 
Reasons of space and context prevent us from examining these aspects in 
further detail. We restrict ourselves to observing that the roots of the global comity 
discourse are, in both its real-world and theoretical dimensions, unmistakably 
American. 
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VI. Conclusion  
While comity plays a smaller role today than it did two hundred years back, critics 
of the doctrine have always conceded that it was never really forgotten by the 
American legal world: in this study we acknowledge as much, but we also demon-
strate how its use is as lively as ever. If “the definition of comity may be 
tenebrous, its importance could not be more clear”.267 True, comity has 
undoubtedly “transformed”.268 This transformation, though, is not an indication of 
the doctrine’s demise, but rather of its inherently relational logical antecedents, 
sovereignty and territoriality. Comity, in other words, still represents an 
unparalleled “springboard” from which a number of inferences relating to regime 
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